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I. INTRODUCTION

Labor relations in the coal mining industry is in some ways unique
among United States industries. Certainly no other industry has experienced the level of violent conflict that plagued the coal industry in the
early part of this century.' In recent years, however, while the disputes
* Partner, Smith, Heenan, & Althen, Charleston, West Virginia; A.B., Davidson College, 1964; J.D., West Virginia University, 1967. The author is indebted to the members of
his firm for their research and editing assistance.
1. See HOWARD B. LEE, BLOODLETtNG IN APPALACHIA (1969); LON SAVAGE, THiN-
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have remained vigorous and violent, in other ways labor relations in
the coal mining industry have not been different, in kind at least, from
those in other industries.
Despite that, a recent decision of the Acting Regional Director of
Region Nine of the National Labor Relations Board2 has indicated
that, in deciding whether claims that two or more employers should be
treated as one, the normal analysis can be disregarded because of "the
unique nature of the coal mining industry."3 Cited to support this
proposition is the Board's decision in Clayton B. Metcalf where the
majority ruled two employers were to be treated as one "considering
the realities of the coal mining industry."5 In like manner, the Administrative Law Judge in Martiki Coal Corp.6 noted the "conglomerates
that tend to dominate the coal industry" use a "generalized practice of
what has been called 'corporate paper shuffling."' 7
The author participated in the Mingo Logan case and is familiar
with both Clayton B. Metcalf and Martiki Coal Corp. In none of those
cases was any evidence introduced concerning the general nature of
business organizations and labor relations in the coal industry. No
scholarly or other studies of the unique or different "nature" of the
coal mining industry, its "realities" or "general practice" were cited to
or by the decision-makers and research has disclosed none. These generalized statements without evidentiary or scholarly support are surprising.

DER IN THE MOUNTAINS (1984) (history of the Matewan Massacre at Matewan, West Virgin-

ia in 1920 and the Mine Wars in 1912 and 1921); PAUL ANGLE, BLOODY WILLIAMSON
(1952) (history of he more deadly Herrin, Illinois massacre of 1922 in which twenty-three
were killed); and GEORGE S. McGOvERN & LEONARD F. GATLRIDGE, THE GREAT
COALFIELD WAR (1972) (history of the 1913-1914 strike in Colorado, ending in the Ludlow
massacre in which twenty died).
2. Mingo Logan Coal Co. and Mineworkers International Decision and Direction of
Elections, No. 9-RC-16382 (Dec. 20, 1994), review granted, February 8, 1995, by the National Labor Relations Board.
3. Id., slip op. at 7.
4. 223 N.L.R.B. 642 (1976).
5. Id at 644.
6. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1208, 1994 WL 612208 (N.L.R.B.) (Oct. 31, 1994) (refusing
to adopt the Administrative Law Judge's decision as to this point).
7. Id. at 19.
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The purpose of this article is to test the legitimacy of the apparent
uniqueness finding of these three cases. It will first examine the business organization of the coal industry. Then the article will discuss the
two labor law doctrines by which two or more employers are considered one-the single employer and joint employer-both as they have
been generally applied and as applied in the coal industry. Finally, the
article concludes that these recent cases, in which a different standard
is proposed for the coal mining industry because of its "unique nature,"
are not only contrary to the generally applicable law, but are also without any basis in the facts or in the reasoning for application of these
doctrines.
II. BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY
Research disclosed no scholarly study of the business organization
of the United States coal mining industry. From the author's experience8 and conversation with others, however, it clearly appears that no
general pattern exists. Business owners from the largest multinational
corporations to individual proprietorships mine coal in the United
States. While they most often do so individually, there have been some
joint ventures. However, almost all coal operators are corporations.
The primary reason for incorporation is the advantages the corporate form provides in the way of raising capital and limiting liability to
the corporation. As one author explained:
The vast majority of American businesses are small sole proprietorships
which do not enjoy limited liability. Coal mining and related operations,
however, typically require relatively large amounts of capital and involve a
significant risk of catastrophic loss. As a result, the coal mining industry
makes pervasive use of the corporate form.9

8. For the entirety of his more than twenty-five years in practice, the author has
represented employers in the coal industry and advised them about their business organization and structure. This section is based primarily on what that experience has taught.
9. JAMES L. GARDNER, Limiting Enterprise Liability: Business Structures in the Coal
Industry, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. Ch. 9, § 9.01 (1989).
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While most all coal operators use the corporate form, that does not
mean that their business structures are alike. Quite to the contrary,
some coal companies operate each of their mines and each aspect of
their mining themselves, without the use of subsidiaries or contractors,
while others make extensive use of both. It is in the latter case where
single and joint employer issues arise.
These issues arise primarily in two circumstances. First, single
employer issues occur when a coal operator structures itself into a
parent holding and service company with separate operating subsidiaries
to perform the actual mining. In this situation, the parent typically
provides the sales and accounting services, but the remainder of the
mine operations are conducted by the separate subsidiaries. Usually,
there is a separate subsidiary for each logical mining unit, most often a
preparation plant and one or more mines. The separate subsidiaries
manage their own operations, establish and maintain their own labor
relations policies and, except for major investment or capital expenditures, make their own financial decisions. The parent typically provides
sales services through a sales department or separate sales subsidiary
servicing all the operating subsidiaries and financial and accounting
services.
Limiting catastrophic liabilities to the corporation suffering them is
one motive for this structure. However, there are other motives. A
principal motive is the belief that greater effort and productivity can be
achieved through decentralized management. Some operators have
found that smaller, self-directed units are more productive and efficient
than large centrally controlled ones. They believe that employees work
better when they are part of a smaller, more cohesive group, and that
managers will be imaginative and innovative when given greater authority.
The second business structure raising issues of treating two or
more employers as one in the coal mining industry arises from the use
of contractors. Many coal land owners hire contractors to do a significant amount of the work of producing coal. Almost all operators use
construction, trucking and engineering contractors. The joint employer
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issue arises primarily, however, when operators employ mining contractors.
The practice of employing mining contractors is mixed. Many
operators mine all the coal with their own employees and use no mining contractors. At some coal mining complexes, all the mining employers are contractors. The normal practice, however, is to employ
some mining contractors, normally for a type of reserve that the owner
does not wish to mine with its own employees.
Sometimes, the owner runs one or more deep mines and contracts
out the surface reserves. In other instances, the opposite is true with
the owner operating the surface mines and contracting out the underground ones. Normally, the owner conducts the larger, more capital
intensive operation and contracts out the smaller blocks of reserves. In
many instances, owners contract the mining of reserve blocks they
cannot mine profitably. Thus, if they could not contract its mining, the
block would not be mined.
There are significant differences in how major operators and contractors structure their businesses. The major coal operators today are
almost always either subsidiaries of publicly traded corporations or
publicly traded themselves. Mining contractors, on the other hand, are
usually owned by an individual entrepreneur and his family. Major
operators hire from the public; while contractors tend to hire members
of the owner's family, and the owner's friends and neighbors. Major
operators generally run capital intensive, large mines. Contractors'
operations tend to spend a greater proportion of their expenses on labor
and rely on a homogenous, loyal workforce to mine the coal, which
the larger coal owners cannot.
The legal relationship between operator and contractor has some
standard features. Almost always, the owner retains ownership of the
coal, paying the contractor a fee to mine it. The owner sells the
contractors' production, often after blending it with the owner's own.
To assure an efficient sequence of mining, the owner's engineers prepare the contractor's mining plan and inspect the contractor's mine to
assure compliance. The contractor controls its own labor relations,
including setting wages and benefits, hiring and firing. Because of the
uncertainty of mining smaller reserves, contract mining agreements
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usually call for termination on completion of a specified reserve, but
allow for earlier termination, usually on short notice by either party.
Contracting is essential to the success of many mining complexes.
Often, the coal in the smaller reserves mined by contractors is essential
for the blended product the owner markets. Equally often, the
contractor's production is necessary to achieve the level of sales to
make the complex profitable.
The profitability of contract mining is unpredictable. Generally, the
smaller contracted reserves have not been fully explored prior to mining. Mining conditions may be much easier or more difficult than
expected. The coal seam may be consistent or contain unexpected splits
or even disappear. When matters are worse than expected, many contract miners fail. The incidence of bankruptcy among them is high.
Many, however, succeed; some spectacularly.
III.

THEORIES FOR TREATING Two EMPLOYERS As ONE

Labor law generally treats the relationship between employers on
the one hand and their employees and the labor organization which
represent them, on the other. Over years of labor law development, a
number of circumstances have arisen when it is necessary to determine
whether two nominally different employers should be treated as one.
Those circumstances are varied. Included among them are determinations of when the assets and business of two nominally separate
employers should be combined to determine whether they are subject
to the jurisdiction provisions of the National Labor Relations Act or
similar laws; whether one corporation bears responsibility for the labor
law obligations of another; whether the employees of the nominally
separate companies should be placed in the same bargaining unit; and
whether picketing or other strike activity against one nominally separate employer is secondary when the strikers' dispute is with another.
In deciding these issues, the Board and Courts have developed two
principal doctrines for making the determinations-that of "single em-
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ployer" and "joint employer."'" They are apparently applied the same
way in all contexts.' These doctrines are the subject of this article.
A. Single Employer
1. General Application
The Board and the Courts examine four criteria when determining
the single employer status of ostensibly separate employer entities: (1)
the interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized
control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership.' 2 While both
the courts and the Board rarely find any single factor controlling, they
tend to stress the element of centralized control of labor relations,13
which the Board interprets as an indicator of operational integration.
Common ownership, on the other hand, tends to be the least significant
factor in determining single employee status. 4 Ultimately, a finding of
10. There is a related doctrine of "alter ego" which determines whether two nominally
separate companies are, in reality, only one as opposed to whether the two are so related to
one another as to be treated as one-the purpose of the joint and single employer doctrines.
Alter ego is generally used to determine whether a claimed new company operating a business is in reality the "disguised continuance" of the old company. Southport Petroleum Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). Lately, the doctrine has also been applied to claims
that double breasted companies (two commonly owned companies in the same business-one
under a union contract and the other not) should be treated as the same. See N.L.R.B. v.
Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1990). The alter ego doctrine is outside the scope of this paper.
11. The doctrine of single employer is but part of the "ally" doctrine of secondary
boycott law. Teamsters, Local 56 (Curtin Matheson Scientific), 248 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1980).
On that basis, it may appear that a different result might obtain in those cases. See Mine
Workers Int'l (Boich Mining Co.), 301 N.L.R.B. 872, 873 (1991), enforcement denied sub
nom. Boich Mining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 955 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992).
12. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 I.B.E.W. v. Broadcast
Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); Esmark, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
887 F.2d 739, 753 (7th Cir. 1989); N.L.R.B. v. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879, 881 (9th
Cir. 1986); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Famsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 504
(5th Cir. 1982); Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 652 F.2d 1055, 1075 (1st Cir.

1981).
13. See, e.g., Alabama Metal Prods., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1986); Teamsters Local
50 (E.J. Dougherty Oil), 269 N.L.R.B. 170, 174 (1984); Air-Vac Indust. Inc., 259 N.L.R.B.
336 (1981); Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 612 (1973). See also supra note
1.
14. Food & Commercial Workers Local 1439 (Price Enterprises), 271 N.L.R.B. 754,
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single employer status depends upon examination of all relevant factors
to determine whether the entities under consideration are characterized
by an absence of the "arm's length" status customarily found between
unrelated companies."
Common control of labor relations generally means common control over day-to-day personnel decisions. Active or actual control, rather than potential control, over personnel matters is the critical factor. 6
Thus, a parent company's imposed policy of refusal to recognize a
union at its subsidiary's operation may be indicative of common control of labor relations where that decision sets a framework for day-today decisions over terms and conditions of employment. 7 On the other hand, a parent company's decision to establish a non-union operating entity to complement its union operations will not be enough to
establish common control of labor relations absent a showing of the
parent company's actual involvement in the day-to-day personnel decisions of the non-union division.' A significant degree of autonomy
must be exercised by the separate companies in setting their own labor
relations policies and practices and making personnel decisions in order
to avoid finding that the two are actually a single employer.
Common management is a factor that turns on the degree of
shared administrative functions as well as common supervisory and
management personnel. 1' Such factors as commonly prescribed accounting systems or operating rules, centralized budgeting procedures,

756 (1984); Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274, 276 (1976), afj'd sub nom. United
Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 571 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439
U.S. 827 (1978) (finding that because common ownership is a feature of any conglomerate
organization, common ownership without common control will not establish single employer

status).
15. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. N.L.R.B., 518 F.2d 1040, 1045-46
(D.C. Cir. 1975), affd on this issue sub nom. at South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local
627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam).
16. Royal Typewriter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 533 F.2d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 1976).
17. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. N.L.R.B., 518 F.2d 1040, 1046
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See also supra note 13.
18. Local Union No. 80, Sheet Metal Workers (Limbach Co.), 305 N.L.R.B. 312
(1991); Clayton B. Metcalf, 223 N.L.R.B. 642 (1976).
19. N.L.R.B. v. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1986); Penntech Papers Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 706 F.2d 18, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1983).
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shared expenses, common supervisory or management personnel, and
common lines of authority tend to demonstrate single employer status.2" These same factors are sometimes cited as the basis for finding
that an interrelationship of operations exists, which is a separate single
employer criterion.
Interrelation of operations principally turns on such factors as
shared facilities or premises; combined bank accounts; sale of similar
products through similar distribution systems and methods; interchange
of employees; and common computerized payroll or accounting systems.2
2. Coal Industry Application
The Board and the Courts have followed the standard rules in
making single employer judgments in coal industry cases. Most of
these cases deal with corporate structure of a non-mining parent and its
mining subsidiaries. The cases address the traditional, well established
criteria of common ownership and financial control, common management, integration of operations and centralized control of labor relations.22 Likewise, they adhere to the summary rule that:
[W]here the control exercised by one entity over another, ostensibly separate, entity is not characteristic of an arm's length relationship between
unrelated companies it is appropriate to find a single employer relationship.23

20. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d at 882; Penntech Papers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 706 F.2d
18, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1983).
21. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d at 882-83; N.L.R.B. v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543,
551-552 (3d Cir. 1983); N.L.R.B. v. C.K. Smith & Co., Inc., 569 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978); Marine Welding & Repair Works, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 439 F.2d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 1971).
22. Radio & Broadcast Technicians Loc. 1264, I.B.E.W. v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965). See also supra note 12.
23. Blumenfeld Theaters Circuit, 240 N.L.R.B. 206, 215 (1979), enforced, 626 F.2d
865 (9th Cir. 1980). Accord Penntech Papers, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 264, 282 (1982), enforced,
706 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983). See also Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
N.L.R.B., 518 F.2d 1040, 1046-1047 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affid. on this point, 425 U.S. 800
(1976); N.L.R.B. v. Local 810, 460 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The most interesting recent coal industry decisions are
Mineworkers International (Boich Mining Co), 24 before the Board,
and the Sixth Circuit's denial of enforcement Boich Mining Co. v.
N.L.R.B.25 There, the issue was whether Boich Mining Company and
its sister company Aloe Coal Company were a single employer for secondary boycott purposes. Each company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the same parent so the first factor-common ownership-favored single employer status. Separate management and control
of labor relations, however, favored separate or neutral status. The
amount of integration of operations spelled the difference in each decision.26
The Board relied upon a few instances of equipment and parts
exchange, some common usage of employees, and particularly the fact
that "a significant amount of Boich's coal is sent on a regular basis to
Aloe Coal's facility to be worked and blended with coal from the
Aloes Coal Mine .. ."" to find single employer status in "a close
case." 28 The Sixth Circuit disagreed. It found the blending process,
which involved only 5-6% of Aloe Coal's production, to constitute a
"relatively small amount . . . based on a typical arm's length business
transaction. ' The Sixth Circuit was particularly impressed with the
fact that the transaction between Aloe and Boich was arm's length,
typical of transactions with strangers.3"
The other single employer coal cases are not nearly so close or
interesting. They, as opposed to Boich, emphasize the evidence of the
common control of labor relations. They are perhaps best treated by
their treatment of the relevant factors other than common ownership,
which is present in all.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

301 N.L.R.B. 872 (1991).
955 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992).
See also supra notes 24, 25.
Boich Mining Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 875. See also supra note 24.
Boich Mining Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 875.
Boich Mining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 955 F.2d at 435. See also supra note 25.
Boich Mining Co., 955 F.2d at 435.
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a. Common Management
Nearly all cases examine whether the same people manage the
employers under consideration. Where the same people run or have a
significant say in the operations of the two operators, common management is found. When the companies are managed by separate persons,
acting independently (only Boich), the finding is an absence of common management.3
b. Integration of Operations
Several factors other than the blending of products for common
sales relied upon in Boich have been cited from the decision as show-

ing integrated operations. Centralized sales and marketing is a factor
that tends to demonstrate interrelated operations, especially if common
customers are involved. 2 Interchange or sharing of non-management
personnel is likewise considered,33 as is common use of equipment
and facilities.34

31. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1990), enforced,
942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1991); Rebel Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 141, 14446 (1986);
Hiysota Fuel Co., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 763, 766 (1986); The Mower Lumber Co., 276
N.L.R.B. 766, 772 (1985) (applying a single employer analysis but denominating it a "joint
employer" question); Bryar Constr. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 102, 104 (1979).
32. For example, in Consolidation Coal Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 69 (1992), which involved
a request by the UMWA for information concerning the relationship between Consolidation
Coal Company ("Consolidation"), Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company ("CPCC") and Enlow
Fork Mining Company ("Enlow Fork"), the Board found that the UMWA had a "reasonable
basis" to believe that a single employer relationship existed and that, therefore, the Union
was entitled to the requested information. In so finding, the ALJ stated:
In one issue of Consol News, B.R. Brown, in a message from the Chairman, enumerated the achievements of [Consolidation's] marketing department in cultivating
customers for the coal from Bailey Mine [Enlow Fork's mine]. . . . Moreover,
these entities [Consolidation, CPCC and Enlow Fork] were known to jointly sell
the coal produced by the mines and it appeared that [Consolidation] and CPCC
have jointly agreed to sell coal from Bailey Mine.
307 N.L.R.B. at 73. See also Bryar Constr. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 102, 103 (1979).
33. Rebel Coal Co., 279 N.L.RB. 141, 144 (1986); Boich Mining Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
955 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1992). See also supra note 31.
34. Bryar Constr. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 102, 103 (1979). See also supra note 32.
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c. Common Control of Labor Relations
Like common management, common control of labor relations is
primarily found when the same individuals establish or carry out the
labor relations policies of the entities."5 Other indicia are centralized
control of labor relations functions such as training, benefit plan administration, payroll.36 In general, separate control is found when the
employers prove the differences in critical labor policies between the
companies and the independent establishment and maintenance of the
policies."
B. Joint Employer
1. General Application
In contrast to single employer status, joint employer standing occurs not when two companies are shown to be a single, integrated
enterprise according to the four elements discussed above, but rather
when two otherwise separate companies jointly control the labor relations policies of their shared or combined employees. For a number
of years, however, the two concepts were confused in the decisions of
the courts and the Board. Single employer criteria, particularly those

35. Westmoreland Coal Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 528, 531 (1991); Hiysota Fuel Co., 280
N.L.R.B. 763, 767 (1986). See also supra note 31. (Owner of both companies solely responsible for labor relations). In Midwestern Mining, Inc. 277 N.L.R.B. 221 (1985), centralized
control of labor relations was found when:
[T]he labor relations of both MMR and RSI are vested solely in the management
officials of MIVIR. Ira Palmer, McCrate, and Brooks are the top MMR officials
controlling the entire operation at the mining site and all of the employees, whether RSI or MMR, are subject to their overall control and supervision. The record
also reveals that all employees working at the mine site, regardless of which company, are also subject to the direction and control of lower level supervisors working for either company.
277 N.L.R.B. at 225.
36. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1990); Midwestem Mining Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 221, 225 (1985). See also supra notes 31, 35.
37. See, e.g., Martiki Coal Corp., 1994 WL 612208 (N.L.R.B.) (Oct. 31, 1994). See
also infra note 55.
38. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
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dealing with common management and integration of operations were
considered in joint employer decisions. That changed with the decision
of the Third Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Browning-FerrisIndustries of Pennsylvania, Inc. (B.F..) 39 and its acceptance by the Board.40
The B.F.L court acknowledged the court and Board decisions that
merged the two doctrines. 4 It disapproved of them based on the separate statements of standards in the United States Supreme Court decisions. 2 Contrasting joint employer with single employer, the B.F.I.
court said:
In contrast, the 'joint employer' concept does not depend upon the existence of a single integrated enterprise and therefore the above-mentioned
four factor standard is inapposite. Rather, a finding that companies are
'joint employers' assumes in the first instance that companies are 'what
they appear to be'-independent legal entities that have merely 'historically chosen to handle jointly ... important aspects of their employeremployee relationship.'
In 'joint employer' situations no finding of a lack of arm's length
transaction or unity of control or ownership is required, as in 'single
employer' cases. As this Circuit has maintained since 1942, '[i]t is rather
a matter of determining which of two, or whether both, respondents control, in the capacity of employer, the labor relations of a given group of
workers.' The basis of the finding is simply that one employer while contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained
for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of
the employees who are employed by the other employer. Thus, the 'joint
employer' concept recognizes that the business entities involved are in fact
separate but that they share or co-determine those matters governing the
essential terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are
employed by the other employer. Thus, the 'joint employer' concept recognizes that the business entities involved are in fact separate but that they
39. 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).
40. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Western Temporary Servs. Inc., 821 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir.
1987), enforcing 278 N.L.R.B. 469 (1986); Continental Radiator Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. 234
(1987); Ryder Sys. Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1987), enforced, 842 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988);
Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984); Pacemaker Driver Services Inc.,
269 N.L.R.B. 971 (1984), enforced sub nom. Carrier Corp. v. N.L.R.B. 768 F.2d 778 (6th
Cir. 1985), supplemented, 290 N.L.R.B. 405 (1988); Allbritton Communications Inc., 271
N.L.R.B. 201 (1984), enforced 766 F.2d 812 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081

(1986).
41. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d at 1120. See also supra note 39.
42. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc. 691 F.2d at 1119.
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share or. co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and

conditions of employment.43

In examining whether two companies share in co-determining essential terms and conditions of employment of a group of employees,
the Board examines who effectively controls such matters as "hiring,
firing, discipline, supervision and direction."" As indicated in the two
cases discussed below, common supervision or direction alone is not
sufficient.
For example, in Chesapeake Foods,45 the Board refused to find
joint employer status even though Chesapeake scheduled work, provided instruction in certain aspects of its contractor's operations, and set
production quotas.46 The Board noted that it was the contractor who
hired, fired and paid the employees, supplied equipment, handled discipline, and otherwise controlled the working conditions of his employees. 47 Similarly, in TL.L, Inc.," the Board found that limited and
routine supervision by Crown Zellerbach over the employees of T.L.I.
was insufficient to create joint employer status, in light of Crown's
failure to hire, fire, discipline, or otherwise determine the working
conditions of T.L.I.'s workforce.4 9

In Flav-O-Rich, Inc.,50 Job Shop provided temporary work to
Flav-O-Rich for which it charged an hourly fee. Flav-O-Rich supervisors gave out daily work assignments. 5 In one case, Flav-O-Rich required one of the Job Shop employees to keep his time on a Flav-ORich time card, required him to report at a specified time and take
prescribed breaks and lunch periods in specified areas only, and complained to the employee about seeing him in a break area during work

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1122-23 (citations omitted).
Chesapeake Foods, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 405, 407 (1987).
Id
Id
Id.
271 N.L.RB. 798, 799 (1984).
Id.
309 N.L.R.B. 262 (1992).
Id
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time.52 In light of undisputed evidence that Job Shop determined the
employees' essential terms and conditions of employment, the Board
rejected a joint employer claim, finding that the direction and supervision exercised by Flav-O-Rich was limited and routine. 3 Where, on
the other hand, the companies share control over such factors as hiring,
promotion, setting wage rates and hours, and determining holidays and
other days off, the result is different.5"
2. Application To The Coal Industry
Like joint employer law generally, its application in the coal industry can be divided between those before and those after the decision
in B.F.L Before that decision delineated the appropriate difference
between joint and single employer analysis, the cases mixed the criteria, considering single employer criteria-particularly integration of
operations and common management-in the joint employer determination.56 Thereafter, the cases have followed the B.F.I analysis.57
The Board's recent Martiki Coal Corp.58 case dealing with relations between an owner-operator and its contractor is particularly instructive. The Administrative Law Judge found a joint employer relationship, relying upon evidence that the owner concerned itself in the
contractor's scheduling and hiring work assignments and that the
owner's supervisors directed the contractor's workforce.59 However,
the Administrative Law Judge disregarded evidence of a change in the
relationship between the two companies whereby the owner disengaged
itself from decisions involving the contractor's labor relations. The ALJ

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Quantam Resources Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 759 (1991).
55. 691 F.2d at 1117.
56. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 392 (1968); N.L.R.B. v. Jewell
Smokeless Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1970); N.L.R.B. v. Norma Mining Corp.,
206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953); Norma Mining Corp., 100 N.L.R.B. 944, 944-45 (1952).
57. Martiki Coal Corp., 1994 WL 612208 (N.L.R.B.) (Oct. 31, 1994); Double A Coal
Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 689, 698 (1992); Hobbs & Oberg Mining Co., Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 575
(1990); Island Creek Coal Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 858, 861-64 (1986).
58. 1994 WL 612208. See also supra note 57.
59. Martiki Coal Corp., 1994 WL 612208.
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did so because the changes were not documented and testimony as to
the date they were implemented was vague or inconsistent." The
Board disagreed, holding that following implementation of the owner's
policy of leaving contractor labor relations alone (there was no change
in managerial control), the joint employer relationship terminated. 6 '

IV.

ANALYSIS OF COAL INDUSTRY CASES-Do THEY REFLECT
UNIQUE FACTS OR LAW?

There is nothing in facts or legal reasoning of the single and joint
employer cases that justifies a conclusion that the coal mining industry
should be treated differently than any other industry. As the analysis
above indicates, the cases apply the same standards used for other
industries in the same way. Moreover, there are no distinctions in the
way the coal industry is structured or how it uses contractors warranting special or different applications of the rules.
Indeed, the coal industry appears to be different only in a way
which would favor continued application of traditional standards. Some
have suggested changes in single and joint employer law because of
the growing use in the United States labor market of what has become
to be known as a "contingent workforce." 2 This "contingent
workforce" is comprised of part-time and temporary workers who work
alongside of and share the work of regular full-time employees. Contingent workers, however, receive less pay and fewer benefits, particularly medical insurance benefits.63 Some of the members of the contingent workforce are employees not of the company that employs their
regular full-time colleagues or for whom they do the work, but of
separate service companies denominated employment leasing companies.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Workforce: A Challenge for the Future, Paper Presented to American Bar Association, Section of Labor and
Employment Law (Aug. 10, 1993), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 154, at E-1
(Aug. 12, 1993).
63.

M.E.

SHARPE,

ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE SERVICES,

NEW POLICIES

FOR THE

PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 9 (Virginia L. Durivage, ed., Armonk) (1992).
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The facts of the coal industry single and joint employer cases do
not disclose any contingent workforce issues. That is confirmed by the
authors' experience. As reported in the coal mining industry cases,
contractor employees are full-time permanent employees. They earn
good wages. They have health care insurance. The changes in single
and joint employer law being proposed to respond to the changed circumstances of the growing contingent workforce are not called for in
the coal mining industry.
Nor does there exist any other factor warranting special, different
single and joint employer rules for the coal mining industry. The suggestions in Mingo Logan, Clayton Metcalf, and Martiki Coal to the
contrary64 are without cited or existing basis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Modem United States labor law dates from the 1935 enactment of
the Wagner Act.6 5 Its definition of "employer" has remained the same
over the nearly sixty years of its application.6 The Courts and the
Board have developed detailed criteria deciding when two or more
employers should be considered one under that definition.67 Since the
1984 decision in B.F.I, those criteria have been uniformly accepted
and applied. There is nothing unique about the coal industry warranting
a change or a different application of the criteria.

64. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
65. Pub. L. No. 35-198, 49 Stat. 449.

66. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
67. See supra note 12.
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